Pedestrians approaching each other on a sidewalk sometimes end up in an awkward interaction known as the "sidewalk salsa": they both (repeatedly) deviate to the same side to avoid a collision. This provides an interesting use case to study interactions between pedestrians and mobile robots because, in the vast majority of cases, this phenomenon is avoided through a negotiation based on implicit communication. Understanding how it goes wrong and how pedestrians end up in the sidewalk salsa will therefore provide insight into the implicit communication. This understanding can be used to design safe and acceptable robotic behaviour. In a previous attempt to gain this understanding, a model of pedestrian behaviour based on the Communication-Enabled Interaction (CEI) framework was developed that can replicate the sidewalk salsa. However, it is unclear how to leverage this model in robotic planning and decision-making since it violates the assumptions of game theory, a much-used framework in planning and decision-making. Here, we present a proof-of-concept for an approach where a Reinforcement Learning (RL) agent leverages the model to learn how to interact with pedestrians. The results show that a basic RL agent successfully learned to interact with the CEI model. Furthermore, a risk-averse RL agent that had access to the perceived risk of the CEI model learned how to effectively communicate its intention through its motion and thereby substantially lowered the perceived risk, and displayed effort by the modelled pedestrian. These results show this is a promising approach and encourage further exploration.

A market scoring rule (MSR) – a popular tool for designing algorithmic prediction markets – is an incentive-compatible mechanism for the aggregation of probabilistic beliefs from myopic risk-neutral agents. In this paper, we add to a growing body of research aimed at understanding the precise manner in which the price process induced by a MSR incorporates private information from agents who deviate from the assumption of risk-neutrality. We first establish that, for a myopic trading agent with a risk-averse utility function, a MSR satisfying mild regularity conditions elicits the agent's risk-neutral probability conditional on the latest market state rather than her true subjective probability. Hence, we show that a MSR under these conditions effectively behaves like a more traditional method of belief aggregation, namely an opinion pool, for agents' true probabilities. We also point out the interpretation of a market maker under these conditions as a Bayesian learner even when agent beliefs are static.